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WHAT CONSTITUTES FULL PROTECTION
OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS?
NADINE STROSSEN*
The question with which we are dealing-Should the Bill of
Rights fully protect fundamental freedoms?-is one that obvi-
ously demands an affirmative answer. Two more interesting
and challenging questions remain, however. First, what consti-
tutes full protection? Does it consist merely of governmental
non-interference, as Professor Richard Epstein has suggested,1
or does it consist further of affirmative government obligations,
as Professor Robert Ellickson has discussed?2 Second, what are
fundamental freedoms? Are all such freedoms included in the
Bill of Rights, or are some derived from other sources?
These basic questions have concerned and divided the
Supreme Court and constitutional scholars throughout our na-
tion's constitutional history. I suspect they have engaged the
Federalist Society throughout its ten-year history. These ques-
tions certainly have concerned and divided members of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) during the seventy-two
years of its existence.'
Defining the appropriate nature and protection of civil liber-
ties is central to the ACLU's mission, and the ACLU uses the
term "civil liberties" as a synonym for fundamental freedoms.
Our activities span hundreds of issues that impinge upon such
fundamental freedoms. Nonetheless, ACLU leaders share no
monolithic view about the appropriate definition and protec-
tion of civil liberties. National policies are adopted as a product
of lengthy study and vigorous debate, and often reflect closely-
split votes on the part of the Board of Directors.
The ACLU now consists of approximately 300,000 members
and approximately fifty affiliates (mostly statewide). The affili-
ates may adopt their own policies, which may differ somewhat
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1. See Richard A. Epstein, The Indivisibility of Liberty Under the Bill of Rights, 15 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 37 (1992).
2. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 17-20 (1992).
3. For a survey history of the ACLU, see SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN
LIBERTES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990).
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
from those adopted by the National Board. The ACLU's phi-
losophy is that different organizational units may espouse di-
verse viewpoints within unitary, but not absolutely uniform,
consensus. Obviously, no thoughtful ACLU member could
possibly agree with all the positions that the national ACLU
and its affiliates throughout the country have taken during the
past seventy-two years. Many of these issues are exceedingly
difficult and complicated and, like Supreme Court decisions
and congressional legislation, do not easily yield to unanimous
results.
Notwithstanding differences among ACLU activists about
specific civil liberties questions, there is a general ACLU ap-
proach to identifying civil liberties issues. This approach con-
stitutes one means of resolving the question posed to this
panel.
I must introduce the ACLU approach to identifying civil lib-
erties issues by noting that the organization is neutral with re-
spect to partisan politics, adhering to the dictates of no political
party. Nor do we regard ourselves as "liberal" as distinct from
"conservative." Indeed, we seek to conserve the Eighteenth
Century values that were held by those who wrote the Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights. Adherents of both liberal and
conservative politics regularly criticize the ACLU. Correspond-
ingly, some ACLU positions coincide with those of both the left
and the right on the political spectrum.
It should not be surprising, then, that I agree with some of
the views expressed by each of the Symposium participants.
Lately, in my academic travels, I have sometimes been seen as a
relative conservative on panels or at conferences that were
heavily influenced by the Critical Legal Studies movement. In
contrast, I am seen as a relative liberal at this conference. This
experience illustrates the political neutrality of civil libertarian-
ism. We adhere to the ideology of liberty, as that term was un-
derstood in the late Eighteenth Century, and as it is modified in
current circumstances, regardless of where that places us on
the political spectrum.
Contrary to the charge of its critics from the right, the ACLU
adheres to a classic view of civil liberties. Yet, contrary to the
charge of its critics from the left, the ACLU does not rigidly
define civil liberties in terms narrowly coextensive with the Bill
of Rights. I will address each of these charges in turn.
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The civil liberties the ACLU defends are essentially classic
political and civil liberties, what some have called the "great
rights." This is a limited set of rights in two important respects.
First, the ACLU seeks to enforce limitations on government ac-
tion-negative rights. The government may not interfere with
our freedom of speech or the freedom of the press and so
forth. The ACLU has not championed the affirmative entitle-
ments that Professor Ellickson mentions,4 except in narrowly
defined circumstances where there is in our view a clear nexus
to a traditional right. Second, the ACLU generally defends civil
and political liberties rather than economic, social, and cultural
rights, except insofar as the latter are connected to the former.
These limitations on the set of rights that the ACLU strives
to preserve have resulted from a constant debate within the or-
ganization. Since the ACLU was founded, some of its leaders
consistently have tried to move toward advocating broad eco-
nomic and social rights, such as the right to shelter, the right to
governmental economic benefits, and the right to ajob. Just as
consistently, the national ACLU has resisted that pressure,
although a few affiliates have espoused some such rights from
time to time.
An example used by Professor Ellickson, the right to shel-
ter,5 illustrates this internal ACLU debate. The ACLU National
Board formulated its policy on homelessness and civil liberties
in 1988-89.6 A segment of the ACLU leadership argued, on
substantive due process and state constitutional grounds, that
the organization should advocate an affirmative right to shelter
or housing. The National Board rejected that argument in
favor of a position that focuses on the nexus between classic
civil liberties and homelessness.
First, although the government has no obligation to get in-
volved in the housing market, to the extent that it has chosen to
enter that market, the ACLU maintains that the government
must do so in a nondiscriminatory, nonarbitrary way; the gov-
ernment must not by its politics penalize a defined segment of
our society, nor maintain policies that result in the denial of
4. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 17-20.
5. See id.
6. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICY GUIDE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES UNION 370 (Policy #301), 409b (Policy #318) (rev. Nov. 27, 1990) [hereinafter
ACLU POLICY GUIDE].
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fundamental rights.7 For example, in contemporary America,
the government has entered the housing market through the
tax program, which subsidizes middle-class and upper-income
families, through housing subsidies of various kinds, and also
through zoning laws.' In our view, such programs and laws
must not result in discrimination.
Second, the ACLU maintains that homeless individuals
should not forfeit basic civil and political liberties.9 For exam-
ple, the fact that people lack permanent addresses does not jus-
tify depriving them of the right to vote. Nor may homeless
children be deprived of their rights to attend public schools
and to have access to equal educational opportunities as the
result of homelessness.
Two recent judicial decisions further illustrate the ACLU's
classic approach to homelessness and civil liberties. In May
1991, a federal district judge in New Jersey struck down Mor-
ristown, New Jersey's public library rules on personal hygiene
and appearance, which the ACLU had challenged on behalf of
homeless library users. 10
The ACLU argued that library regulations barring "unneces-
sary staring" and "patrons whose bodily hygiene is so offensive
as to constitute a nuisance" were unconstitutionally vague, giv-
ing excessive discretion to the librarians charged with enforc-
ing the policy." Federal Judge H. Lee Sarokin agreed,
explaining that a public library is a "living embodiment of the
First Amendment," and therefore must tolerate "that which is
offensive."' 2 Characterizing the rules as endangering the rights
of the poor and the homeless, Judge Sarokin stated:
The greatness of our country lies in tolerating speech with
which we do not agree; that same toleration must extend to
people, particularly where the cause of revulsion may be of
our own making. If we wish to shield our eyes and noses
from the homeless, we should revoke their condition, not
their library cards.' 3
The ACLU's advocacy of traditional civil liberties for the
7. See id at 409-409c.
8. See id.
9. See id at 409c.
10. See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 765 F. Supp. 181 (D.NJ. 1991).
11. Id at 183-84.
12. Id. at 182.
13. Id. at 183.
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homeless is also illustrated by another judicial victory. The
Connecticut Supreme Court recently accepted the ACLU's ar-
gument that a homeless person has a constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures in a public area
where he customarily sleeps and maintains his personal
possessions. 14
Examining the ACLU's approach to civil liberties in the con-
text of the international human rights movement reinforces my
point that the ACLU adheres to a classic view of civil liberties. I
refer to those rights to which the community of nations has
widely agreed through the so-called International Bill of
Rights:'' the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' 6 the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 , and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. 8 Though the United States has not ratified these docu-
ments, 9 they are so widely accepted around the world that
many international law scholars argue that they constitute cus-
tomary international law, 20 which in the international legal sys-
tem operates much like the common law in our domestic legal
system. 2 1
The rights recognized by the International Bill of Rights re-
14. See State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330
(1991).
15. For the complete texts of the relevant United Nations resolutions, as well as a
discussion of the history and significance of the International Bill of Rights, see THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul Williams ed., 1981).
16. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
17. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
18. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
19. PresidentJimmy Carter, on behalf of the United States, signed the International
Covenants on Human Rights in 1977. Without ratification, however, the United States
has not committed itself to be bound by them under international treaty law. The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, a non-binding declaration, does not require ratifi-
cation. See THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTs, supra note 15, at 101-03.
20. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over Interna-
tional Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 22 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 53, 68-71 (1981); Kathryn Burke et al.,Application of International Human Rights
Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEx. INT'L LJ. 291, 315-22 (1983); Note,Judicial En-
forcement of International Law Against the Federal and State Governments, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1269, 1269-71 (1991); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir.
1980) (citing the International Bill of Human Rights as support for the content of cus-
tomary international law).
21. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice");
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Burke et al., supra
note 20, at 315-22; Note, supra note 20, 1273-75.
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veal by comparison how narrow is the ACLU's view of rights. In
the international sphere, commentators frequently talk of three
generations of rights. 22 The generation that we emphasize in
the United States, the first, consists of classic political and civil
liberties, and had its origin in the Eighteenth Century Enlight-
enment. A second generation of rights consists of economic,
social, and cultural rights, which have been recognized in this
century, particularly in socialist countries. Even the second
generation, though, is passe in parts of the developing world.
Some international human rights activists and scholars now
embrace a third generation of rights: collective rights to secur-
ity, peace, clean air, a healthy environment, and so forth.23
The ACLU, by contrast, concentrates on the first generation,
the classic civil and political liberties of the type recognized in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 24 The
ACLU does not endorse the broader, affirmative formulations
of rights common in the international arena.25 It does not en-
dorse the rights set forth in the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, much less any broader
"collective rights."
The development and implementation of the ACLU's poli-
cies concerning homelessness and the contrast with the inter-
national human rights movement illustrate my first major
point. The ACLU has resisted pressure to assert affirmative
economic rights, focusing instead on classic civil and political
liberties. At the same time, however, the ACLU has recognized
that there may be links between economic status and civil liber-
ties. Accordingly, the ACLU has insisted that government ac-
22. See, e.g., Sompong Sucharitkul, A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights in In-
ternational Law, 62 NOTRE D.ME L. REV. 305, 316 (1987).
23. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, Reform, Revolution, or Retrenchment?: International Human
Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 339, 341-43, 348-51 (1991); Philippe
J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L LJ. 393, 394
(1989) ("[T]he notion of environmental rights ought to be established on the interna-
tional plane."). One convenient way to think of this progression is in terms of the
French revolutionary slogan, "libert&, egalit6, et fraternit": political and civil liberty,
group equality, and finally collective rights.
24. The ACLU's general support for United States ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is qualified by urging that this ratification be
accompanied by one reservation and one declaration, designed to ensure that ratifica-
tion would not lead to a reduction of liberty in the United States. See Hearings on the
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations (Dec. 13, 1991) 102d Cong., 2d Sess. - (1991) (statement of the
ACLU).
25. See ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 6, at 429-33 (Policy #401).
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tion may not cause or perpetuate poverty, and may not abridge
the civil and political rights of poor people.26
Although the ACLU does not espouse far-ranging notions of
affirmative economic or social rights, it does not rigidly confine
civil liberties to those enshrined in the Bill of Rights.2 7 This is
my second major point: The ACLU follows a flexible approach
in defining civil liberties.
Civil liberties are not necessarily coextensive with the Bill of
Rights. As William Barr has noted, the mere structure of our
government, with its system of divided and separated powers,
can be a vehicle for protecting rights.2s Additional evidence
that civil liberties and the Bill of Rights are not coterminous is
that some provisions of the Bill of Rights do not even address
civil liberties. The Second Amendment, for example, protects
the right to bear arms expressly in the context of a "well regu-
lated Militia." 29 Consistent with the prevailing judicial interpre-
tation of that constitutional amendment, 0 the ACLU does not
view the Second Amendment as barring reasonable regulation
of hand guns, for example.3 1
Conversely, there are many important civil liberties that are
not found in the first ten amendments. For example, the ACLU
maintains that the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitu-
tion-the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments--do protect basic civil liberties. From time to time, I
hear the contention that the ACLU was once a good and pure
organization, back in the good old days when it was only de-
fending free speech. Then, according to this view, the ACLU
took a wrong turn by recognizing that there is more to civil
26. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
27. See generally ACLU PoLicy GUIDE, supra note 6; WALKER, supra note 3 (describing
the history of the ACLU and its many battles for expansive interpretations of civil
rights).
28. See William P. Barr, Three Levels of Human Decisionmaking and the Protection of Funda-
mental Rights, 15 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 11, 13 (1992).
29. U.S. CONsr. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
30. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (requiring a reasonable
relationship between the possession of a firearm and the preservation of a well-regu-
lated militia); United States v. Warn, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
right to keep and bear arms applies only in the context of a state militia), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 948 (1976); see also United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir.
1974) (recognizing that courts have consistently held that the Second Amendment
right only has meaning in relationship to a well-regulated militia).
31. See ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 6, at 95-96 (Policy #47).
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liberties than free speech.12 Some find particularly objectiona-
ble the ACLU's insistence on enforcing the post-Civil War con-
stitutional amendments.
First, such a comparison of the "good old ACLU" and the
"bad modern ACLU" is historically fictional. The ACLU from
the beginning focused on Fourteenth Amendment issues and
did not focus exclusively on the First Amendment.
Second, the ACLU considers the Reconstruction amend-
ments to be an essential part of the Constitution and an impor-
tant enlargement of the fundamental freedoms that the Bill of
Rights protects. First, they make the Bill of Rights enforceable
against state and local governments, which is crucial in terms of
individual freedom. Second, they ensure equality, a basic right
that is not explicitly recognized in either the original Constitu-
tion or the Bill of Rights.
The ACLU goes further and maintains that there are civil lib-
erties that are recognized nowhere in the Constitution or any
of its amendments. These are statutory rights that protect the
individual's relationship with some nongovernmental entities
and certain powerful actors in the private sector.33 Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, s4 for instance, prohibits certain
private entities from discriminating in employment on the basis
of race, gender, and other invidious classifications. The ACLU
regards freedom from such discrimination as a civil liberty,
although it does not derive from the Constitution.
One of the ACLU's latest initiatives is to protect workers'
rights more broadly against the powers of their employers.
People spend so much of their lives in an employment situa-
tion, and employers have such vast economic and practical
power over their employees' lives, that to permit employers to
deprive employees of free speech, privacy, or due process is,
for all practical purposes, in large measure to strip working
people of those rights.
I disagree with those who claim that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act should be repealed because only the government
has sufficient power to deprive individuals of liberty. In reality,
we do have a welfare state; we do have a government that has
32. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 3, at 317-18.
33. See ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 6, at 106-106e (Policy #55), 205 (Policy
#111).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
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massively intervened in the economic and social arrangements
under which we live. As a consequence of government actions,
there are private agglomerations of power capable of depriving
individuals of liberty.8 5 To some extent, some private actors
can be viewed as government agents.3 6 Even without a nexus to
state action, the ACLU maintains that such agglomerations
should have no more power than government agents to deprive
individuals of basic rights.
In sum, the ACLU pursues a principled, non-partisan ap-
proach to the civil liberties questions before this panel. As I
illustrated in my first major point, the ACLU focuses on the
defense of classic civil and political liberties. My second point,
however, reveals that the ACLU defines basic civil liberties with
relative flexibility. Consequently, the ACLU protects individual
liberties, but it does not limit those liberties to the ones enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights or infringed by government ac-
tion. A vision of a world in which all individuals feel equally
secure in their fundamental freedoms requires such an
approach.
35. See, e.g.,Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding Due
Process Clause inapplicable to termination of service by a privately-owned electrical
monopoly); Watts v. Union Pac. R.R., 796 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding due
process not offended by arbitrary and capricious employee firing); Elmore v. Chicago &
Ill. M. Ry., 782 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding due process not offended by denial of
notice and procedural safeguards).
36. For a discussion of the development and status of the state-action doctrine, see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW §§ 18-1 to 18-7 (2d ed. 1988).
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